






Brian D. Earp, Thomas Douglas, and Julian Savulescu 
 





In this chapter, we introduce the notion of “moral neuroenhancement,” offering a novel 
definition as well as spelling out three conditions under which we expect that such 
neuroenhancement would be most likely to be permissible (or even desirable). Furthermore, 
we draw a distinction between first-order moral capacities, which we suggest are less 
promising targets for neurointervention, and second-order moral capacities, which we suggest 
are more promising. We conclude by discussing concerns that moral neuroenhancement 
might restrict freedom or otherwise “misfire,” and argue that these concerns are not as 
damning as they may seem at first. 
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In recent years, a number of philosophers, neuroethicists, and others have become 
preoccupied with “moral enhancement.” Very roughly, this refers to the deliberate moral 
improvement of an individual’s character, motives, or behavior. In one sense, such 
enhancement could be seen as “nothing new at all” (Wiseman 2016, p. 4) or as something 
philosophically mundane: as G. Owen Schaefer (2015) has stated, “Moral enhancement is an 
ostensibly laudable project … Who wouldn’t want people to become more moral?” (p. 261). 
To be sure, humans have long sought to morally enhance themselves (and their children) 
through such largely uncontroversial means as moral education, meditation and other similar 
practices, engagement with moral ideas in literature, philosophy, and religion, and discussion 
of moral controversies with others. What is different about the recent debate is that it focuses 
on a new set of potential tools for fostering such enhancement, which might broadly be 
described as “neurotechnologies.” These technologies, assuming that they worked, would 
work by altering certain brain states or neural functions directly, in such a way as to bring 
about the desired moral improvement.  
 What exactly this would look like, and the mechanisms involved, are unclear. As John 
Shook (2012, p. 6) notes: “there is no unified cognitive system responsible for the formation 
and enaction of moral judgments, because separable factors are more heavily utilized for 
some kinds of moral judgments rather than others.” Moreover, “the roles of emotions in 
moral appreciation and judgment, alongside (and intertwining with) social cognition and 
deliberate reasoning, are so complex that research is only starting to trace how they influence 
kinds of intuitive judgment and moral conduct.”  
 Nevertheless, suggestions in the literature for possible means of pursuing moral 
enhancement by way of direct modulation of brain-level targets—at least in certain 
individuals, under certain circumstances or conditions—range from the exogenous 
administration of neurohormones such as oxytocin (in combination with appropriate 
psychological therapy or social modification) to potentially increase “pro-social attitudes, like 
trust, sympathy and generosity” (Savulescu & Persson 2012, p. 402; see also Donaldson & 
Young 2008; but see Bartz et al. 2011; Lane et al. 2015, 2016; Nave, Camerer, & 
McCullough 2015; Wudarczyk et al. 2013), to the alteration of serotonin or testosterone 
levels to mitigate undue aggression while at the same time ostensibly enhancing fair-





Montoya et al. 2012; Savulescu & Persson 2012; but see Wiseman 2014 re: serotonin), to the 
application of newly developed brain modulation techniques, such as non-invasive (but see 
Davis & Koningsbruggen 2013) transcranial electric or magnetic stimulation, or even deep 
brain stimulation via implanted electrodes (for scientific overviews, see, e.g., Fregni & 
Pascual-Leone 2007; Perlmutter & Mink 2005; for ethical overviews, see, e.g., Clausen 2010; 
Hamilton, Messing, & Chatterjee 2011; Maslen et al. 2014; Rabin et al. 2009; Synofzik & 
Schlaepfer 2008).  
 Potential uses of brain stimulation devices for moral enhancement include attempts to 
reduce impulsive tendencies in psychopaths (Glenn & Raine 2008; but see Maibom 2014), as 
well as efforts to treat addiction and improve self-control, thereby making associated 
“immoral behavior” less likely (Savulescu & Persson 2012, p. 402). In addition, some 
research has shown that disruptive stimulation of the right prefrontal cortex or the 
temporoparietal junction can affect moral judgments directly—for example, judgments 
relating to fairness and harm (Knoch et al. 2015; Young et al. 2010); however, the 
circumstances of these and other similar investigations have been thus far largely contrived, 
such that the real-world implications of the findings are not yet apparent (Wiseman 2016). 
More ecologically valid results pertain to the administration of drugs such as methylphenidate 
or lithium to violent criminals with ADHD or to children with conduct disorder to reduce 
aggressive behavioral tendencies (see, e.g., Ginsberg et al. 2013, 2015; Ipster & Stein 2007; 
Margari et al. 2014; Turgay 2009), as well as antilibidinal agents to reduce sexual desire in 
convicted sex offenders (Douglas et al. 2013; Lösel & Schumucker 2005; Thibaut et al. 
2010). Such measures remain controversial, however, both ethically (Craig 2016; Earp, 
Sandberg, & Savulescu 2014; Gupta 2012; Singh 2008) and conceptually, i.e., in terms of 
their status as moral enhancers as opposed to mere forms of “behavioral control” (see 
Focquaert & Schermer 2015; see also McMillan 2014).   
 To date, the majority of the philosophical literature on moral enhancement has been 
oriented around two major strands of thought: (1) Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu’s 
argument that there is “an urgent imperative to enhance the moral character of humanity” and 
to pursue research into moral neuroenhancements as a possible means to this end (2008, p. 
162; see also 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014), and (2) Thomas Douglas’s and David 
DeGrazia’s arguments that it would sometimes be morally permissible (in Douglas’s case) or 
morally desirable (in DeGrazia’s case) for individuals to voluntarily pursue moral 





Both strands of thought have been subjected to vigorous criticism (for an overview, see 
Douglas 2015; see also Parens 2013). For their part, Persson and Savulescu have primarily 
been interested in whether humanity falls under an imperative to pursue or promote the 
development of technologies that would enable moral neuroenhancement on some 
description. However, even if there is such an imperative, it might turn out that it would be 
morally impermissible to deploy any of the technologies that would be developed. On the 
other hand, even if there is no imperative to pursue such technologies, it might be morally 
permissible, or even morally desirable (or obligatory), for people to use some moral 
neuroenhancers that are nevertheless developed. Thus, there is a further question regarding 
the moral status of engaging in (as opposed to developing the technologies for) moral 
neuroenhancement, and it is this question to which we will confine ourselves in the latter part 
of this chapter. First, however, it is important to clarify what we mean by the term “moral 
neuroenhancement,” and to show that such a thing could ever be possible. We will start by 
laying out some definitions.  
 
What is moral (neuro)enhancement? 
 
In her wide-ranging essay, “Moral Enhancement: What Is It and Do We Want It?,” Anna 
Pacholczyk (2011) outlines three major ways of understanding the term “moral 
enhancement,” two of which we will consider here. The first is: a moral enhancement is a 
change in some aspect of a person’s morality that results in a morally better person (p. 251, 
paraphrased). This is broadly the sense we have in mind for this chapter, but it is not quite 
precise, nor is it sufficiently focused, for our purposes, on enhancements that work “directly” 
on the brain—i.e., moral neuroenhancements in particular. We therefore propose an 
alternative definition: 
 
Moral neuroenhancement: Any change in a moral agent—effected or facilitated in 
some significant way by the application of a neurotechnology—that results, or is 
reasonably expected to result, in the agent being a morally better (i.e., more moral) 
agent. 
 
Let us call this the agential conception of moral neuroenhancement. Note that the moral 
“betterness” of an agent could be understood in various ways. For example, it could be taken 





excellence of the agent, or the increased moral desirability of the agent’s character traits, 
taken together (see Douglas 2015 for further discussion). But however it is plausibly 
understood, as Pacholczyk notes, being moral (let alone more moral) is “a complex ability 
and there is a wide range of potentially enhancing interventions. Making morally better 
people could include making people more likely to act on their moral beliefs, improving their 
reflective and reasoning abilities as applied to moral issues, increasing their ability to be 
compassionate, and so on” (2011, p. 253). Of course, there are likely to be serious and 
substantive disagreements about what should or should not be included on this list, as well as 
what should or should not be counted as “morally better” in the first place. This is an 
important issue to which we will return throughout this chapter. 
 The second major sense of “moral enhancement” discussed by Pacholczyk is this: a 
moral enhancement is a beneficial change in moral functioning (p. 251, paraphrased). Here 
the idea is, first, to identify an underlying psychological or neurological function that is 
involved in moral reasoning, decision-making, acting, etc. (that is what makes the function 
“moral,” a descriptive claim), and then to intervene in it “beneficially” (a normative claim). 
But “beneficially” could mean different things, depending on one’s normative perspective, 
and also on what is to be benefitted or improved. Is it the agent? Her moral character? Her 
well-being? The function itself? The world? Pacholczyk explores several possibilities but 
does not settle on a single answer.  
 We will focus on “the function itself.” In so doing, we will draw on what two of us 
have dubbed the functional-augmentative approach to enhancement, often encountered in the 
wider bioenhancement literature (Earp, Sandberg, Kahane, & Savulescu 2014; see also 
Savulescu, Sandberg, & Kahane 2011). According to this more general approach, 
“Interventions are considered enhancements … insofar as they [augment] some capacity or 
function (such as cognition, vision, hearing, alertness) by increasing the ability of the function 
to do what it normally does” (Earp, Sandberg, Kahane, & Savulescu, 2014, p. 2, emphasis 
added).  
 This way of understanding “enhancement” will serve as the foil to our preferred 
approach (the agential approach), so we will spell it out a bit further. Take the case of vision. 
A functional-augmentative enhancement to this capacity would be one that allowed a person 
to see more clearly, identify objects at a greater distance, switch focus more quickly and with 
less effort, and so on, than she could do before the intervention (on some accounts, regardless 
of whether she had been dealing with a so-called “medical” problem along any of the relevant 





allowed a person to perceive a wider range of decibels, say, or to discriminate between 
auditory signals more easily and with greater accuracy. Or take the case of memory: on a 
functional-augmentative approach, a person’s memory would be “enhanced” if—in virtue of 
some intervention—she could now recall more events (or facts), more vividly, or for a longer 
duration than before.  
 Importantly, none of this is to say that these functional augmentations would be 
desirable. Clearly, that would depend upon a number of factors, including the person’s 
values, needs, and wishes (as well as those of relevant others), her physical and social 
environment, and her past experiences, to name but a few. To continue with the example of 
memory, one need only to think of soldiers who have experienced the traumas of war, or of 
survivors of rape or other forms of sexual assault, to realize that memory, and especially 
augmented memory, has the potential to be “a devastating shackle” (Earp, Sandberg, Kahane, 
& Savulescu 2014, p. 4; see also Earp 2015).  
 Or let us return to the case of hearing. Depending on how this capacity is described1 
and on the circumstances in which one found oneself, augmented hearing might turn out to be 
extremely undesirable: just imagine being trapped in a perpetually noisy environment. A 
similar analysis, we believe, applies to many other functions or capacities that are commonly 
discussed in the neuroenhancement literature. Simply put: “more is not always better, and 
sometimes less is more” (Earp, Sandberg, Kahane, & Savulescu 2014, p. 1). Indeed, in some 
cases, the diminishment of a specific capacity or function, under the right set of 
circumstances, could be required to achieve the best outcome.  
 And so it is for moral capacities. Whether having “more” of a morally-relevant capacity 
or emotion such as empathy, righteous anger, or a sense of fairness is desirable (morally or 
otherwise) depends upon numerous factors: the circumstances, one’s baseline moral 
motivations and capacities, the social role one is fulfilling, and so on (see Douglas 2008; 
Douglas 2013). It seems plausible that a morally good agent would be able to respond 
flexibly to different situations, and to employ or tap into different cognitive and emotional 
                                                
1 This caveat points to an ambiguity in our functional-augmentative account of enhancement. As we wrote, such 
enhancement involves “increasing the ability of the function to do what it normally does” (Earp et al. 2014, p. 
2). But what is the “ability of [a] function,” exactly, and what does it mean to “increase” it? Plainly, it depends 
upon the function in question, which in turn depends upon, among other things, the level of description one uses 
to cordon off that function from alternative targets of intervention. In this case, if by “augmented” hearing, one 
meant simply more sensitive hearing, as implied by our illustration, then a noisy environment might indeed 
make this “enhancement” undesirable. If instead one meant the augmentation of a higher-order hearing 
capacity—one that allowed a person to pick up on subtle sounds in a quiet environment, but also to “tune out” 
loud and uncomfortable sounds in a noisy environment, then the augmentation of this more flexible, higher-
order capacity would be much more likely to be regarded as desirable across a range of possible circumstances. 
This is very similar to what we have in mind when we talk about the neuroenhancement of higher-order moral 





resources as necessary to arrive at the motives, decisions, and behaviors that are morally 
desirable given the context. As we will argue, it is this higher-order capacity to respond 
flexibly and appropriately to a range of scenarios that should be augmented, if possible, to 
achieve reliable moral enhancement.  
 Consider the ability to empathize. This is, on any reasonable account, a capacity that is 
“implicated in moral reasoning, decision-making, acting and so forth” (Pacholczyk 2011, p. 
253), and it is one whose potential modification has become a staple of the moral 
enhancement literature (see, e.g., Persson & Savulescu 2013). To see how this capacity might 
be biomedically “enhanced” in the functional-augmentative sense, imagine that someone took 
a drug similar to MDMA (see, e.g., Sessa 2007) which, at least temporarily, made it so that 
the person became able to experience more empathy, or to experience empathy more readily, 
in response to relevant stimuli. Would this be morally desirable? Would the person behave 
“more morally” while under the influence of the drug? Obviously, it depends. As we will see 
in the following section, the relationship between increasing or strengthening a morally-
relevant capacity such as empathy (“enhancing” it, in the functional-augmentative sense), 
morally improving one’s motives and behavior, and becoming a morally better agent, is 
complex and context-specific. It also depends on which moral theory is correct or most 
justified, which is open to dispute: obviously, people will disagree about what constitutes, 
e.g., “morally desirable behavior,” and they may also disagree about how, if at all, the moral 
goodness of an agent depends upon the moral desirability of her behavior (or motivations, 
etc.).  
 In short, if the goal is to produce morally better agents, on whatever (plausible) 
conception of “morally better”—as we have suggested should be the case, and as we have 
highlighted with our agential definition of moral neuroenhancement—then a narrow focus on 
“boosting” specific moral capacities, we believe, is likely to be at best a small part of the 
story.  
 
The limits of empathy 
 
To see why this is the case, let us pursue the example of empathy in greater detail.2 As the 
neuroscientist Simon Baron-Cohen (2011) has argued, even such “obviously” morally 
desirable capacities as the ability to empathize may have morally undesirable consequences 
in certain cases. Mark Stebnicki (2007), for example, has discussed the phenomenon of 
                                                





“empathy fatigue,” which refers to the physical and emotional exhaustion that grief and 
trauma counselors sometimes come to face: their inability to distance themselves emotionally 
from the pain and suffering of their clients may ultimately interfere with optimal job 
performance (for related work, see, e.g., Melvin 2012 and Perry et al. 2011 on “compassion 
fatigue” among nurses). Likewise, Carol Williams (1989) has hypothesized that among 
helping professionals, high emotional empathizers may be disposed to earlier career burnout, 
thereby undermining their long-term effectiveness (see Zenasni et al. 2012 for a more recent 
discussion). 
 Empathy can also lead us astray when it comes to making moral judgments specifically. 
For example, there is the “identifiable victim” effect (but see Russell 2014), according to 
which people have a stronger emotional reaction to the suffering of a known individual 
(thereby motivating them to help that specific individual) than to the greater suffering of an 
“anonymous” individual (or group of individuals) that would benefit more from the same act 
or degree of help (see, e.g., Jenni & Loewenstein 1997; Small & Loewenstein 2003). As the 
economist Thomas Schelling (1984) once observed: “Let a six-year-old girl with brown hair 
need thousands of dollars for an operation that will prolong her life until Christmas, and the 
post office will be swamped with nickels and dimes to save her. But let it be reported that 
without a sales tax the hospital facilities of Massachusetts will deteriorate and cause a barely 
perceptible increase in preventable deaths—not many will drop a tear or reach for their 
checkbooks” (p. 115). Making the point more generally, Jesse Prinz (2011) has 
argued, “empathy is prone to biases that render moral judgment potentially harmful” (p. 214).  
 Similar statements have been made by Paul Bloom (2013, 2016), Peter Singer (2014), 
Ole Martin Moen (2014), and others. While this intellectual movement “against empathy” 
(Bloom 2016), and in favor of more “abstract” or “cold” cognition geared toward maximizing 
welfare on a utilitarian calculus has its detractors (e.g., Christian 2016; Cummins 2013; 
Srinivasan 2015; but see McMahan 2016), the broader point remains the same: moral agents 
require flexibility in how they “deploy” their lower-order moral capacities, so that they can 
respond appropriately to justified reasons for making certain kinds of decisions over others. 
By contrast, trying generally to “dial up” or “dial down” some discrete moral capacity or 
function (assuming that such a thing were even possible without incurring serious adverse 
side-effects) will be at best a highly unreliable means to becoming a morally better agent.  
 Thus, whether spraying a dose of oxytocin up someone’s nose to increase empathy or 
trust, say, is likely to amount to an agential moral enhancement will depend not only upon the 





in which this is done. For example, it will depend upon who is receiving the dose of oxytocin, 
what her values are, what her chronic and momentary mental states are, what situation(s) she 
is in both short and long-term, what particular decisions she faces, and is likely to face, and 
so on (see Wudarczyk et al. 2013 for a related discussion).  
 So it wouldn’t be just “more empathy” (tout court) that would be expected to lead to 
the improvement of a moral agent, qua moral agent, but rather an increase in what might 
roughly be described as a kind of second-order empathic control – an ability to (1) know or to 
identify, whether consciously or unconsciously, when it is morally desirable to feel empathy 
and/or allow it to shape one’s outward behavior (and in what way), as well as (2) to be able to 
feel such empathy, or if necessary, suppress such feelings (or their effects on behavior), in 
accordance with (1).  
 Similarly with a sense of fairness or justice, feelings of righteous anger or moral 
disgust, motivations associated with causing harm, etc.—the whole suite of underlying moral 
emotions, intuitions, and capacities (see generally, e.g., Haidt 2007; Haidt & Joseph 2004). If 
such capacities could be developed or augmented at their second-order level of description, 
this would be a more promising target, we believe, for interventions aimed at achieving 
(agential) moral enhancement, whether the intervention happened to be carried out with the 
assistance of a neurotechnology that acted directly on the brain, or whether it was of a more 
familiar kind (e.g., traditional moral instruction without the aid of, say, brain stimulation or 
pharmaceuticals). In other words, it is likely that augmenting higher-order capacities to 
modulate one’s moral responses in a flexible, reason-sensitive, and context-dependent way 
would be a more reliable, and in most cases more advisable, means to agential moral 
enhancement.  
 
Direct vs. indirect moral enhancement 
 
We are not the first to distinguish between the direct modification of specific moral traits, 
functions, or emotions versus the modification of higher-order moral capacities. Instead, our 
discussion shares some features with, for example, Schaefer’s recent examination of “direct 
vs. indirect” moral enhancement (Schaefer, 2015). Direct moral enhancements, according to 
Schaefer, “aim at bringing about particular ideas, motives or behaviors,” which he sees as 
being problematic for a number of reasons, in much the same way that we see the functional 
augmentation of first-order moral capacities or emotions as being problematic. By contrast, 





produce the morally correct ideas, motives or behaviors without committing to the content of 
those ideas, motives and/or actions” (Schaefer, 2015, p. 261, emphasis added), an aim that is 
consistent with that of the second-order interventions we have just alluded to.  
 Briefly, Schaefer disfavors “direct” moral enhancement (especially if it were carried 
out programmatically, by, for example, a state, rather than undertaken voluntarily on a case 
by case basis) because he worries that such “enhancement” could suppress dissent: if 
everyone were forced to hold the exact same or even highly similar moral beliefs, 
dispositions, etc., then moral disagreement would likely fall by the wayside. But such 
disagreement is valuable, Schaefer argues, because without it, “conventional wisdom will go 
unchallenged and moral progress becomes essentially impossible” (Schaefer, 2015, p. 265). 
Schaefer also disfavors “direct” moral enhancement because, in his view, such enhancement 
might interfere with, bypass, or otherwise undermine conscious reasoning and rational 
deliberation. Instead of “coming to believe or act on a given moral proposition because it is 
the most reasonable,” he fears, “we would come to believe or act on it because a particular 
external agent (the enhancer) said it is best” (p. 268) and perhaps even “implanted” it in our 
brains. 
 We are not confident that this fear is justified. At least, more work would need to be 
done to show how such enhancement would be significantly different from, or worse than, 
various current forms of moral education that aim at inculcating specific moral tendencies, 
values, and beliefs—sometimes, as in the case of children, without first explaining the 
reasons why (although such explanations may of course later be given or become apparent 
over time on their own). Insofar as this is a valid concern, however, it could plausibly be 
addressed by emphasizing the need for individual, voluntary enhancement, as opposed to top-
down or coerced external enhancement, and indeed Schaefer seems open to this view. But 
whatever the solution to this problem, we agree that the ability to deliberate and to rationally 
evaluate different moral propositions is important, and that there would be strong reasons 
against pursuing any form of moral enhancement that had the effect of impairing such an 
ability. 
 In fact, this very same acknowledgement of the importance of rational deliberation 
(though note that we do not presume that genuine moral insights must always be strictly 
rationally derived) paves the way for one of Schaefer’s main proposals for what he sees as an 
alternative to direct moral enhancement, namely “indirect” moral enhancement. “It is quite 
plausible to think,” he writes, “that there is value in the process itself of deliberating over a 





One form of indirect moral enhancement that would be at least prima facie permissible (and 
perhaps even desirable), then, in light of this consideration, would be to improve the 
reasoning process itself. The idea is that, all else being equal, better reasoning is likely to 
result in better moral beliefs and decisions, and consequently to better—that is, more moral—
action.  
 What would this actually look like? Among other things, it might involve improving 
people’s logical abilities (i.e., “people’s ability to make proper logical inferences and 
deductions, spot contradictions in their own beliefs and those of others, as well as formulate 
arguments in a way that can highlight the true point of contention between interlocutors”); 
promoting conceptual understanding (since “vague and distorted ideas will lead to unreliable 
inferences, inducing behaviors that are not in line with someone’s considered judgments”); 
and overcoming cognitive biases (Schaefer 2015, p. 276). Importantly, none of these 
enhancements would force a person to adopt any particular moral position, motivation, or 
behavior—thereby allowing for moral disagreement to persist, which is important, Schaefer 
claims, for moral progress—nor would they undermine rational deliberation, since, by 
definition, they would be expected to foster it. Certainly, allowing and/or helping people to 
reason better, with fewer biases, should be seen as uncontroversial (setting aside for now the 
crucial question of means); and this does seem to be plausible way of “mak[ing] people more 
reliably produce the morally correct ideas, motives, and/or actions without specifying the 
content of those ideas, motives, and/or actions” in advance (p. 262; see also Douglas 2008, p. 
231; Douglas 2013, p.161). 
 Schaefer’s other major proposal for “indirect” moral enhancement is something he calls 
“akrasia reduction,” where akrasia is defined as acting against one’s better judgment, 
typically due to weakness of will. As Schaefer writes:  
Weakness of will affects morality in a very straightforward way. Someone recognizes 
that some course of action is morally ideal or morally required, but nevertheless fails to 
carry out that action. For instance, someone might recognize the moral imperative to 
donate significant sums of money to charity because that money could save a number 
of lives, yet remain selfishly tight-fisted. This is a failure of someone’s consciously-
held moral judgments to be effective. (2015, p. 277) 
 
 Schaefer argues that individuals should be permitted to “work on” their weakness of 
will—in order to reduce associated akrasia—but that no one should be forced to undertake 





brought up by their parents; for a related discussion see Maslen et al. 2014). Again, this 
seems uncontroversial: strengthening one’s will to act in accordance with one’s considered 
judgments, moral or otherwise, is usually3 a virtue on any plausible account (see Persson & 
Savulescu 2016); the only significant debate in this area, as we have just suggested, has to do 
with the question of means (see Focquaert & Schermer 2015). 
 Traditional moral education, including the development and maintenance of good 
motivations and habits, is the most obvious—and least contentious—possibility. We take it 
that attempting to reduce one’s weakness of will (and improve one’s reasoning abilities) by 
such “traditional” methods as, e.g., meditation, Aristotelian habituation (see Steutel & 
Spiecker 2004), studying logic or moral philosophy, and engaging in moral dialogue with 
others, is clearly permissible—indeed laudable—and we expect that few would disagree. This 
is the “philosophically mundane” version of moral enhancement that we flagged in our 
introduction. It is rather moral enhancement4 by means of, or at least involving, 
neurotechnological intervention, specifically, that we expect will be seen as more 
controversial, and we turn to this case in the following section. 
 
 
The role of neurotechnology in moral enhancement 
Is it permissible, or even desirable, to engage in “indirect” moral self-enhancement (on 
Schaefer’s account), or agential moral self-enhancement via modulation of second-order 
moral capacities (on our account), with the help of neurotechnologies? Let us first re-
emphasize that we are concerned only with voluntary moral (self) enhancement in this 
chapter, which we take to be the easiest case to justify, chiefly on liberal or libertarian 
grounds: we are setting aside the much more difficult question of whether wide-scale 
enhancement of, e.g., the moral character of all of humanity could be justified (if it were 
possible). Let us also state at the outset that if moral enhancement with the aid of 
neurotechnology is in fact permissible or even desirable, it is likely to be so only under 
certain conditions. For reasons we will soon discuss, the most promising scenario for 
permissible, much less desirable or optimal, agential moral (self) neuroenhancement seems to 
                                                
3 Obviously, there are exceptions. Consider Heinrich Himmler; he had firm (but false) moral beliefs, and given 
this, the weaker his will, the better (see, for discussion, Bennett 1974). Schaefer (2015) actually discusses this 
issue at length, arguing, essentially, that while there are always exceptions to the rule, in most cases and on 
balance, akrasia reduction will lead to moral improvement.  
4 Here we mean “indirect” moral enhancement (on Schaefer’s account) or agential moral enhancement via 





us to be one in which at least the following conditions apply: 
 
(1) the drug or technology in question is used as an aid or adjunctive intervention to 
well-established “traditional” forms of moral learning or education (rather than used, as 
it were, in a vacuum), such that 
 
(2) the drug or technology allows for conscious reflection about and critical 
engagement with any moral insights that might be facilitated by the use of the drug (or 
by states-of-mind that are occasioned by the drug); and 
 
(3) the drug or technology has been thoroughly researched, with a detailed benefit-to-
risk profile, and is administered under conditions of valid consent  
  
 We are not prepared to argue that any currently available drug meets all three of these 
conditions. However, it does seems possible that some currently available putative cognitive 
enhancers, such as modafinil and methylphenidate (see, e.g., Greely et al. 2008; Turner et al. 
2003; but see Lucke et al. 2011; Outram 2010), could, if used as an adjunct to moral 
education, potentially meet them in the future. So too might certain drugs or other 
neurointerventions that worked by attenuating emotional biases that would otherwise impede 
moral learning (although research in this area is currently nascent and scarce). Finally, 
although we will discuss the example of so-called psychedelic drugs in the following section, 
we must be clear that we do not advocate the use of these drugs by anyone, in any setting, but 
are rather flagging them as possible targets for future research (see Earp, Savulescu, and 
Sandberg 2012 for a related discussion).  
 With respect to conditions (1) and (2), it should be noted that “traditional” means of 
moral education frequently operate by enhancing an agent’s moral understanding: her 
understanding of what morality requires and why. This requires some degree of rational 
engagement. Now, some critics of “direct” moral neuroenhancement, such as John Harris 
(2012, 2013) have suggested that interventions into what we are calling first-order moral 
emotions or capacities would not enhance the agent’s moral understanding. Others have made 
similar claims. Fabrice Jotterand (2011), for instance, argues that “[w]hile the manipulation 





content, for example, norms or values to guide one’s behavioral response” (p. 6, see also p. 
8). Similarly, Robert Sparrow (2014a) suggests that “It is hard to see how any drug could 
alter our beliefs in such a way as to track the reasons we have to act morally,” and that 
“someone who reads Tolstoy arguably learns reasons to be less judgmental and in doing so 
develops greater understanding: someone who takes a pill has merely caused their sentiments 
to alter” (p. 2 and p. 3).5  
 But what about reading Tolstoy while taking a pill (i.e., a pill that enhances one’s moral 
learning vis-à-vis the text)? The supposition here is that this hypothetical pill would occasion 
a state of mind that made the moral lessons of Tolstoy more apparent, or more compelling, to 
the reader.6 Indeed, the importance of a robust educational or learning context cannot be 
overstated: what we envision is a facilitating, rather than determining role for any drug or 
neurotechnology (see Naar in press; see also Earp, Sandberg, & Savulescu in press), 
underscoring the need for critical engagement with some kind of actual moral “content” (e.g., 
“norms or values”). Arguably, we need not look to the distant future, or to hypothetical sci-fi 
scenarios, to imagine what such drug-assisted (as opposed to drug-caused, or drug-
determined) agential moral enhancement might plausibly look like. Instead, we can look to 
the past and present.  
 
Attempted moral neuroenhancements, past and present 
 
In a recent book chapter, the theologian Ron Cole-Turner (2015) writes that technologies of 
moral enhancement “are not new. For millennia we have known that certain disciplines and 
techniques can enhance our spiritual awareness. We have also known that certain substances 
can alter our consciousness in interesting ways” (p. 369). Jonathan Haidt (2012) expands on 
this idea, noting that most traditional societies have a coming-of-age ritual designed to 
transform immature children into morally and socially competent adults, and that many of 
them use “hallucinogenic drugs to catalyze this transformation” (p. 266). The mental states 
induced by such drugs, according to anthropologists, are intended to “heighten” moral 
                                                
5 Please note that the page numbers for the Sparrow quotes come from the version of his essay available online 
at http://profiles.arts.monash.edu.au/wp-content/arts-files/rob-sparrow/ImmoralTechnologyForWeb.pdf.  
6 But note that there are other ways of responding to the above concerns as well. For example, some defenders 
of moral neuroenhancement have suggested that even “direct” interventions into first-order moral emotions or 
capacities could conceivably improve moral understanding, in certain cases, by attenuating emotional barriers to 
sound moral deliberation (Douglas 2008). And even if a first-order moral neuroenhancement intervention had no 
positive effect on moral understanding initially, Wasserman (2011) has argued that we might expect an agent’s 
experience with morally desirable motives and conduct (as judged against a relatively stable background) to lead 
to a development in moral understanding over time. This parallels the Aristotelian point that one comes to know 





learning “and to create a bonding among members of the cohort group” (quoted in Haidt 
2012, p. 266).  
 Notice the words “enhance,” “catalyze” and “heighten” in these quotations, which 
suggest a facilitating, rather than strictly determining, role for the hallucinogenic drugs in 
these societies, administered as part of a richly contextualized process of moral learning. This 
is worth highlighting, in our view, since moral lessons, abilities, dispositions, etc., that are 
achieved or developed with the help of a neurotechnology—as opposed to directly caused by 
it (thereby preserving space for conscious reflection, effort, and engagement)—could be seen 
as posing less of a threat to such important issues as authenticity, autonomy, and rational 
deliberation, as emphasized by (among others) Schaefer (2015).  
 Consider the use of ayahuasca, a plant-based brew containing MAO-inhibitors and 
N,N-dimethyltryptamine or DMT, which has been employed in traditional shamanic 
ceremonies across the Amazon basin and elsewhere for hundreds of years (McKenna, 
Towers, & Abbott 1984; Homan 2011). According to Michael J. Winkelman (2015, p. 96) the 
active ingredients in ayahuasca, in combination with a certain restrictive diet, may occasion 
an “altered state of consciousness” in the initiate in which her “artistic and intellectual skills” 
are seen as being enhanced, thereby allowing her to better appreciate the teachings of the 
shaman. Winkelman stresses, however, the interactive relationships among: healer and 
patient (initiate), various “ritual factors,” and what he calls psycho- and socio-therapeutic 
activities, in shaping the learning experience. A similar emphasis is given by William A. 
Richards (2015, p. 140) in reference to the drug psilocybin: 
 
It is clear that psilocybin … never can be responsibly administered as a medication to 
be taken independent of preparation and careful attention to the powerful variables of 
[one’s mindset] and [physical] setting. One cannot take psilocybin as a pill to cure 
one’s alienation, neurosis, addiction, or fear of death in the same way one takes aspirin 
to banish a headache. What psilocybin does is provide an opportunity to explore a range 
of non-ordinary states. It unlocks a door; how far one ventures through the doorway and 
what awaits one … largely is dependent on non-drug variables.  
 
We caution the reader that it is not currently legal in many jurisdictions to consume these 
substances (see Ellens & Roberts 2015 for further discussion), and we reemphasize that we 
are not advocating their use by any person, whether for attempted moral enhancement or 





hallucinogenic drugs have been used in certain settings resemble the approach to moral 
enhancement for which we argue in this chapter (i.e., a facilitating role for the 
neurotechnology, active engagement with moral content, a rich learning context, etc.), 
suggesting that this approach is not a radical departure from historical practices. That said, 
rigorously controlled, ethically conducted scientific research into the effects of such drugs on 
moral learning or other moral outcomes (in concert with appropriate psychosocial and 
environmental factors) may well be worth pursuing (Tennison 2012; see also Frecska, Bokor, 
& Winkelman 2016; Griffiths et al. 2006, Griffiths et al. 2008). 
   
Objections and concerns 
 
We see it as uncontroversial that individuals have moral reasons to increase the moral 
desirability of their character, motives, and conduct, and that actually doing so is morally 
desirable. Moral neuroenhancements in particular appear to be immune to many of the more 
common moral concerns that have been raised about neuroenhancements (or 
bioenhancements generally). These concerns have often focused on ways in which 
neuroenhancements undergone by some individuals might harm or wrong others, for 
example, by placing them at an unfair competitive disadvantage or by undermining 
commitments to solidarity or equality. Moral neurenhancements are unusual among the main 
types of neuroenhancements that have been discussed heavily in the recent literature in that 
they might plausibly be expected to advantage, rather than disadvantage, others (though see, 
for a criticism of this view, Archer 2016).  
 Nevertheless, some significant concerns have been raised regarding the permissibility 
and desirability of undergoing moral neuroenhancements, or certain kinds of moral 
neuroenhancements. Some of these are general concerns about enhancing the moral 
desirability of our characters, motives, and conduct, regardless of whether this is undertaken 
through moral neuroenhancement or through more familiar means such as traditional moral 
education. In this category are concerns that stem from a general skepticism about the 
possibility of moral improvement, as well as concerns about whether we have adequate 
means for resolving disagreement and uncertainty about what character traits, motives, and 
conduct are morally desirable and why. However, the first of these concerns strikes us as 
implausible: even if people disagree on certain moral issues, there are surely some moral 
behaviors and/or dispositions that everyone can agree are better than some alternative moral 





possible to move even a little bit from the less desirable side of things toward the more 
desirable side, then (agential) moral improvement is also possible. As for the second concern 
about resolving disagreements, this does not seem to us to be  damning even if it is true: of 
course there will be disagreements about what counts as “morally desirable”—in the realm of 
traditional moral enhancement as well as in the realm of moral neuroenhancement—but as 
Schaefer (2015) points out, such disagreement is in fact quite healthy in a deliberative society 
and is perhaps even necessary for moral progress.  
 Other points of contention have to do with general concerns about neuroenhancement 
that would also apply to non-moral neuroenhancements. In this category are concerns 
regarding the unnatural means or hubristic motives that biomedical enhancement is said to 
involve (Kass 2003, Sandel 2007). We will set those issues aside as being tangential to the 
focus of this chapter. There are, however, also more specific concerns about moral 
neuroenhancements—concerns that would not apply equally to traditional means of moral 
enhancement or to other kinds of neuroenhancement. The remainder of this section outlines 
two dominant concerns in this category. 
 
Concern 1: Restriction of Freedom  
 
One concern that has been raised regarding moral neuroenhancement, or at least certain 
variants of it, is that it might restrict freedom or autonomy. Harris (2011) argues that we 
might have reason to abstain from moral neuroenhancements because they would restrict our 
freedom to perform morally undesirable actions or to have morally undesirable motives (see 
also Ehni & Aurenque 2012, p. 233 and, for a more general discussion of the effects of 
neuroenhancement on autonomy, Bublitz & Merkel 2009).   
 Two main types of response have been made to this line of argument. The first is that, 
even where moral neuroenhancements do restrict freedom, it might nevertheless be morally 
permissible or, all things considered, morally desirable to undergo such enhancements 
(DeGrazia 2014; Douglas 2008, 2011; Savulescu et al.  2014; Savulescu & Persson 2012; 
Persson & Savulescu 2016). Suppose that you come across one person about to murder 
another. It seems that you should intervene to prevent the murder even though this involves 
restricting the prospective murderer’s freedom to act in a morally undesirable way. Similarly, 
it seems that, if he could, the would-be murderer should have restricted his own freedom to 
commit the murder, for example, by having a friend lock him in his room on days when he 





intuitions is to suppose that, in at least some cases, any disvalue associated with restricting 
one’s freedom to act in morally undesirable ways is outweighed by the value of doing so.  
 The second response has been to deny that all moral neuroenhancements would in fact 
restrict freedom, thus limiting the concern about freedom to a subset of moral 
neuroenhancements. Responses in the second category sometimes begin by noting that 
worries about the freedom-reducing effect of moral neuroenhancements presuppose that 
freedom is consistent with one’s motives and conduct being causally determined (Persson & 
Savulescu, 2016). If we could be free only if we were causally undetermined, we would 
already be completely unfree, because we are causally determined, in which case moral 
neuroenhancements could not reduce our freedom. Alternatively, we are free only because, at 
least some of the time, we act on the basis of reasons, in which case moral 
neuroenhancements which operate without affecting (or by actually enhancing) our capacity 
to act on the basis of reasons would not reduce our freedom (DeGrazia 2014; Savulescu et al. 
2014; Savulescu and Persson 2012; Persson and Savulescu 2016). 
  Finally, although we cannot pursue this argument in detail, we have suggested that 
agential moral neuroenhancement could plausibly be achieved by targeting second-order 
moral capacities, thereby increasing a kind of “moral impulse control.” On this account, we 
should be open to the idea that moral neuroenhancments could actually increase a person’s 
freedom, that is, her ability to behave autonomously. Niklas Juth (2011, p. 36) asks: “Can 
enhancement technologies promote individuals’ autonomy?” And answers: “Yes. In general 
plans require capacities in order for them to be put into effect and enhancement technologies 
can increase our capacities to do the things we need to do in order to effectuate our plans.” 
Similarly, Douglas (2008) has argued that diminishing counter-moral emotions (things that 
tend to interfere with whatever counts as good moral motivation) is also a kind of second-
order moral enhancement, and in many cases it will also increase freedom (since the counter-
moral emotions are also constraints on freedom; see also Persson & Savulescu, 2016). 
 
Concern 2: Misfiring 
 
A second concern that can be raised regarding moral neuroenhancements maintains that 
attempts at moral neuroenhancement are likely to misfire, bringing about moral deteriorations 
rather than improvements. This is not a concern about successful moral neuroenhancements, 






 Harris (2011) advances this concern by noting that “the sorts of traits or dispositions 
that seem to lead to wickedness or immorality are also the very same ones required not only 
for virtue but for any sort of moral life at all” (p. 104). He infers from this that the sorts of 
psychological alterations that would be required for genuine moral neuroenhancement would 
involve not the wholesale elimination or dramatic amplification of particular dispositions, but 
rather a kind of fine-tuning of our dispositions (see also Jotterand 2011, p. 7; Wasserman 
2011). However, he argues that the disposition-modifying neurotechnologies that we are 
actually likely to have available to us will be rather blunt, so that attempts at such fine-tuning 
are likely to fail.  
 We might respond to this in two ways. First, we agree, as we argued earlier, that the 
elimination or amplification of particular moral dispositions or capacities is likely, on 
balance, to be an unreliable way of bringing about genuine (agential) moral enhancement. 
But we are less convinced that the technologies we are likely to have available to us could not 
bring such enhancement about. This is based on our exploration of the possibility of drug-
assisted moral learning, where we drew on the examples from certain so-called traditional 
societies, where such moral learning is generally understood not only to be possible, but also 
(at least sometimes) actually occurrent. Whether such moral learning involves, or amounts to, 
a “fine-tuning of our [moral] dispositions,” then, would be beside the point, because agential 
moral neuroenhancement would, by whatever mechanism, be taking place (thus showing that 
it is indeed possible).  
 Agar (2010, 2013) sets forward a more limited variant of the concern raised by Harris. 
He argues that attempted moral neuroenhancements may have good chances of success when 
they aim only to correct subnormal moral functioning (such as, e.g., might be exhibited by a 
hardened criminal), bringing an individual within the normal range, but that they are likely to 
misfire when they aim to produce levels of moral functioning above the normal range (he 
does not comment on moral neuroenhancements that operate wholly within the normal 
range). Subnormal moral functioning is often the result of relatively isolated and easily 
identified defects such as, for example, the deficient empathy that characterizes psychopathy 
(but see Bloom 2016 for further discussion). Agar speculates that these defects could 
relatively safely be corrected. However, he argues that, to attain super-normal levels of moral 
desirability, we would need to simultaneously augment or attenuate several different 
dispositions in a balanced way. This, he claims, will be very difficult and there is a serious 





 Defenders of moral neuroenhancement have conceded to these concerns, 
acknowledging both that (1) in many cases, complex and subtle interventions would be 
needed in order to enhance moral desirability and that (2) this creates a risk that attempted 
moral neuroenhancements will fail, perhaps resulting in moral deterioration (Douglas 2013; 
Savulescu et al. 2014). However, it is not obvious that achieving super-normal moral 
functioning would, as Agar suggests, always require the alteration of multiple capacities. 
Imagine a person who would function at a super-normal level, except for the fact that she 
performs suboptimally on a single moral dimension. An intervention affecting that dimension 
alone might be sufficient to achieve super-moral functioning. Moreover, focusing on 
augmenting the powers of more traditional moral education, as we have proposed here, could 
be expected to produce moral improvements across a range of dimensions, and might in this 
way produce the breadth and balance of moral improvement that Agar takes to be necessary 
without requiring multiple distinct enhancement interventions.  
 Finally, some doubt has been cast on the notion that neurointerventions are invariably 
inapt when complex and subtle psychological alterations are sought. For example, Douglas 
(2011) notes that there are other areas—such as clinical psychiatry—where we often also use 
rather blunt biological interventions as part of efforts to achieve subtle and multidimensional 
psychological changes. Yet in that area we normally think that attempting some interventions 
can be permissible and desirable if undergone cautiously, keeping open the option of 
reversing or modifying the intervention if it misfires. Douglas suggests that a similar 




In this chapter, we have considered moral enhancement in terms of agential moral 
neuroenhancement. This means any improvement in a moral agent, qua moral agent, that is 
effected or facilitated in some significant way by the application of a neurotechnology. We 
have distinguished between first- and second-order moral capacities. First-order capacities 
include basic features of our psychology which are relevant to moral motivations and 
behavior, such as empathy and a sense of fairness. As we argued, there is no straightforward 
answer to whether augmenting these functions constitutes agential moral enhancement, just 
as one cannot say that having super-sensitive hearing is good for a person without knowing 
that person's situation (for a related discussion in the context of disability, see Kahane & 





being able to employ it in the right circumstance and in the right way, which means having 
appropriate control over its regulation. 
 In addition, we have emphasized a facilitating role for neurotechnologies in bringing 
about moral enhancement, rather than a determining role, which leaves room for rational 
engagement, reflection, and deliberation: this allowed us to address concerns that such 
processes might be undermined. Another consequence of thinking in terms of facilitation is 
that moral neuroenhancers should not ideally be used “in a vacuum,” but rather in a meaning-
rich context, as we illustrated briefly with “traditional” examples (e.g., ayahuasca). Finally, 
we have responded to two main moral concerns that have been raised regarding the pursuit of 
moral neuroenhancement, namely that it would restrict freedom or else “misfire” in various 
ways. We argued that these concerns, while worth taking seriously, are not fatal to the view 




Minor portions of this chapter have been adapted from Douglas (2015). The first author 
(Earp) wishes to thank the editors of this volume for the opportunity to contribute a chapter, 
and Michael Hauskeller for inviting him to present some of these ideas at the 2016 Royal 
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